We investigate the association between the media coverage of firms' CEO pay packages and subsequent shareholder voting on say-on-pay resolutions, and find that negative media coverage is able to predict shareholder discontent over say on pay. When we divide media coverage into coverage in the...

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability' is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less...

This study extends prior research on the role of compensation consultant in the design of executive remuneration and investigates firms' choices of performance targets in executive compensation. Using unique hand-collected data on 257 London Stock Exchange listed firms from FTSE 350 and Small...

We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms’ strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay...