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Transmission mechanisms of executive compensation to cost of equity capital
Kanyarat Lek Sanoran - In: Global business and finance review 27 (2022) 4, pp. 108-117
Purpose: The nature of each component of executive compensation varies, resulting in variances in executive in- centives and investor pricing. To examine whether there is a differential relation between executive compensation components and cost of equity capital, this study decomposes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013433578
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Lessening effects of SOX on the relationship between executive compensation components and cost of equity capital
Kanyarat Lek Sanoran - In: International Journal of Financial Studies : open … 10 (2022) 3, pp. 1-12
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) imposed stringent requirements on corporate executives to hold them more accountable for their management decisions. This act has ramifications for executive pay as well. This study investigates the lessening effects of SOX on the association between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013368360
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Accounting-based compensation and debt contracts
Li, Zhi; Wang, Lingling; Wruck, Karen H. - 2018 - CURRENT DRAFT: February 2, 2018
We examine how accounting-based compensation plans influence a firm's contracts with its creditors. After granting long-term accounting-based compensation plans (LTAPs) to CEOs, firms pay lower spreads and have fewer restrictive covenants in new bank loans. Mechanisms leading to lower borrowing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011963302
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CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation : Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts?
Kim, Hyung Tae - 2018
This study examines how the equity compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) and that of outside directors affect management earnings forecasts (MFs) and the relationship between these two positions in terms of compensation. Our evidence reveals that CEO (director) equity compensation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920195
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Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
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Does Obfuscating Excessive CEO Pay Work? The Influence of Remuneration Report Readability on Say-on-Pay Votes
Hooghiemstra, Reggy - 2017
This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability' is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965319
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Linking Societal Trust and CEO Compensation
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran (Giri) - 2016
We examine the association between societal trust and the levels of CEO compensation and the proportion of equity-based compensation of 897 firm-years from 18 countries over the 2007- 2013 period. We find both the levels of CEO compensation as well as the proportion of equity based compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992285
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CFO co-option and CEO compensation
Dikolli, Shane S. - 2019
We study whether relative power in the CEO-CFO relationship influences CEO compensation. To operationalize relative power of a CEO over a CFO, we define CFO co-option as the appointment of a CFO after a CEO assumes office. We find that CFO co-option is associated with a CEO pay premium of about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903005
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Do High CEO Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?
Cheng, Qiang - 2017
There is growing public concern over the rapid growth in CEO pay relative to average worker pay (CEO pay ratio). Critics contend that high CEO pay ratios could destroy firm value by damaging employee morale and/or signal CEO rent extraction. In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset to examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967631
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Noise Hedging and Executive Compensation
Doherty, Neil A. - 2013
We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092522