Showing 31 - 40 of 2,998
This Article is the first academic study to systematically analyze the overall sensitivity of executive compensation to stock buybacks. Specifically, my analysis of executive compensation arrangements of CEOs included in the S&P 500 Index reveals that buybacks can enhance a record high portion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841055
This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036020
In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997720
paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers …' consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such … as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is further aggravated by the use of control …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033141
In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025560
While executive compensation is often blamed for the excessive risk taking by banks, little is known about the operating performance incentives used in the finance industry both prior to and subsequent to the recent crisis. We provide a comprehensive analysis of incentive design -- the link of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962226
In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027087
In their reply to our critique, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2012) suggest that (i) Apple is a prime example of how board regulations affect CEO pay and should therefore not be excluded from the study, and (ii) their original results are robust to excluding the outliers when extending the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105085
Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation from managers involved in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851392
Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. We find that this pay ratio disclosure leads to declines in both total compensation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861111