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Do Compensation Clawback and Holdback Provisions Change Executive Reporting Choices?
Hodge, Frank D. - 2012
The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to include a clawback or holdback clause in executive compensation contracts. Using an experiment, we examine how executives react to the enforcement of these clauses after a restatement. We find that executives generally reduced the riskiness of their financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103865
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CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation : Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts?
Kim, Hyung Tae - 2018
This study examines how the equity compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) and that of outside directors affect management earnings forecasts (MFs) and the relationship between these two positions in terms of compensation. Our evidence reveals that CEO (director) equity compensation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920195
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The Impact of Earnings Management and Managerial Ability on Management Compensation
El Diri, Malek; Alhadab, Mohammad - 2021
behaviour on executive compensation conditioned on managerial ability. We find that managers with better abilities are … part of superior managers’ skills and should be incorporated in their reward contracts. The results show that managerial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250532
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Does financial misconduct affect the future compensation of alumni managers?
Groysberg, Boris; Lin, Eric; Serafeim, George - 2017
We explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory we hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had left the organization years before the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928843
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Does Obfuscating Excessive CEO Pay Work? The Influence of Remuneration Report Readability on Say-on-Pay Votes
Hooghiemstra, Reggy - 2017
This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability' is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965319
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Do High CEO Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?
Cheng, Qiang - 2017
There is growing public concern over the rapid growth in CEO pay relative to average worker pay (CEO pay ratio). Critics contend that high CEO pay ratios could destroy firm value by damaging employee morale and/or signal CEO rent extraction. In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset to examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967631
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Director pay slice, the remuneration committee, and firm financial performance
Rahayu, Nadia Klarita; Harymawan, Iman; Nasih, Mohammad; … - In: Cogent economics & finance 10 (2022) 1, pp. 1-24
This study aimed to analyze the relationship between the director pay slice and firm financial performance. This study used 1024 observations from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2019. The analytical technique used in this study was ordinary least square regression...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013447896
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Outside Director Independence, Auditor Independence and Executive Cash Bonus Compensation
Watrin, Christoph - 2010
This paper examines the association between managers' cash bonuses and discretionary accounting choices in a sample of … German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007. We investigate managers' earnings management behavior with respect to their …-increasing accounting choices by managers. In line with prior research, auditor independence is proxied by the amount of non-audit service …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149997
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Trading away incentives
Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022 - This draft: October 19, 2022
, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
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Taxes and the backdating of stock option exercise dates
Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Erickson, Merle M.; Heitzman, Shane - In: Journal of accounting & economics 47 (2009) 1/2, pp. 27-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003821595