, we find that the executive cash compensation is positively related to management forecast error (MFE) for a sample of …

non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of SG&A expenditures, but this …

non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and …

earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will … expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to … management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the …

The incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings-based compensation increases in managers' terminal years. We …

communication with investors. We investigate to what extent managers exploit their earnings forecasts as a tool of expectations …

We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …