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Previous attempts to analyse international differences in patterns of worker absenteeism have not been convincing because of the difficulty in obtaining internationally comparable data. In this paper, we apply the technique described by Barmby, Ercolani and Treble(1999) to data on full-time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160297
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397242
This study analyses sickness absence in selected European countries. We suggested and applied three sick‑leave measures: global sickness absence rate, frequency rate, and absolute crude absence rate. To calculate the rates, open access data from Eurostat, the OECD, and the WHO were used. On...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529554
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282984
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339778
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340177
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538932
This paper proposes a test for the existence and the degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior. Then we derive testable conditions for reduced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487529
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386819