A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an 'antagonistic' relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the...

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

A case-based approach to comparative company law / David Cabrelli and Mathias Siems -- General case on directors duties / Theis Klauberg -- Duties of nominee directors / Martin Gelter, Memika Gha and D Gordon Smith -- Obligations of directors in takeovers / Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez --...

A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an antagonistic relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the...