The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there are...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there...

We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes’ rule but take the noisy signal at...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there are...

We extend Akerlof's (1970) "Market for Lemons" by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...

We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...