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On the evolution of heuristics and bounded rational behavior in random games

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 2021

The emergence of heuristics, sophisticated behavior—such as higher levels of Theory of Mind—and substantive rationality in strategic situations can be studied using evolutionary game theory to jointly account for the interactions between players and their environments. Research thus far has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314177

Psychology and economics rather than psychology versus economics : cultural differences but no barriers!

Brandstätter, Hermann; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2008

During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809939

Personal Relationships and the Evolution of Trust

Schliffke, Philipp - 2009

In this paper, an indirect evolutionary version of the game of trust is studied. A population consisting of trustworthy and exploitive players is assumed. Players are chosen randomly from the population and are matched with either strangers or players they know in order to play the game of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160188

Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium : a level-k analysis

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L. - 2014

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492

An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence

Gannon, Kim - 2020

resource, and there is uncertainty about who will win the resource if they choose to compete. Players have different confidence … know her opponent's confidence level. We characterize the evolutionarily stable equilibrium, represented by players …' strategies and distribution of confidence levels. Under different informational environments, a majority of players are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853848

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721

Salience and strategy choice in 2 × 2 games

Leland, Jonathan W.; Schneider, Mark - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 521-559

We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383906

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists … at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Evidential equilibria : heuristics and biases in static games of complete information

Al-Nowaihi, Ali; Dhami, Sanjit S. - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 637-676

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384070

How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior : cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment

Gill, David; Knepper, Zachary; Prowse, Victoria; Zhou, Junya - 2024

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014584425