Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two...

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can...

1. Support-bargaining and the evolution of human societies -- 2. Money and money-bargaining -- 3. Macroeconomics and money-bargaining -- 4. Evolutionary economics -- 5. The evolution of money-bargaining -- 6. The state and money-bargaining -- 7. Support-bargaining, credit and confidence -- 8....

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can...