We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer...

In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent. Behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus. The frequency of behavioral types is determined...

The housing rental market offers a unique laboratory for studying price stickiness. This paper is motivated by two facts: 1. Tenants' rents are remarkably sticky even though regular and expected recontracting would, by itself, suggest substantial rent flexibility. 2. Rent stickiness varies...

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from “news.” We show that the buyer's ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In...

We introduce aggregate uncertainty into a Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)-type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model. The market can be either in a high state, where there are more buyers than sellers, or in a low state, where there are more sellers than buyers. Traders do not know the...

I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the...

I study the role of privacy in bargaining. A seller makes offers every instant, without commitment, to a privately informed buyer. Potential competing buyers (entrants) can choose to interrupt the negotiation by triggering a bidding war. Entrants either observe the offers (public bargaining) or...

We study the effect of the transparency of outside options in bilateral bargaining. A seller posts prices to screen a buyer over time, and the buyer may receive an outside option at a random time. We consider two information regimes: one in which the arrival of the outside option is public and...

I study a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game in which a buyer can choose to learn privately about her value of the good. Information generation takes time and is endogenous. After learning, the buyer can disclose verifiable evidence of her valuation to the seller. Examples include venture...

We examine an evolutionary model of bargaining behavior in a society where resources are finite. Agents who develop better strategies for bargaining and trading come to dominate the population. We show that successful agents exhibit loss aversion and an "endowment effect." When information is...