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Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 1998

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608412

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

Coalition Bargaining in Repeated Games

Polanski, Arnold - 2018

We consider an intertemporal game-theoretic framework in which different coalitions interact repeatedly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure arising in this setup are characterized, in a protocol-free manner, when just three natural conditions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936985

Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2020

I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854555

A Bargaining Procedure Leading to the Serial Rule in Games with Veto Players

Arin Aguirre, Javier - 2015

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036720

Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191262

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