The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an...

The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to...

The establishment of an asking, or ceiling, price from which reductions can be bargained is a common selling practice. For a monopolist seller of a single object, this article characterizes the best such ceiling price and shows that its use is optimal among all incentive-compatible mechanisms in...

The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an...

The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to...