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Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system
Pitlik, Hans; Schneider, Friedrich; Strotmann, Harald - In: Public finance review : PFR 34 (2006) 6, pp. 637-662
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003392261
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Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system
Pitlik, Hans (contributor); Schneider, Friedrich (contributor) - 2005
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002641221
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Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system
Pitlik, Hans (contributor); Schneider, Friedrich (contributor) - 2005
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002746112
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Bargaining power of smaller states in Germany's Länderfinanzausgleich 1979-90
Pitlik, Hans; Schmid, Günther; Strotmann, Harald - In: Public choice 109 (2001) 1/2, pp. 183-201
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001654674
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Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer systems
Pitlik, Hans; Schneider, Friedrich; Strotmann, Harald - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013439415
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Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system
Pitlik, Hans; Schneider, Friedrich G.; Strotmann, Harald - 2005
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276558
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Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System
Pitlik, Hans; Schneider, Friedrich G.; Strotmann, Harald - 2005
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276579
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Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System
Pitlik, Hans; Schneider, Friedrich; Strotmann, Harald - 2021
Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318668