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In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171871
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002390841
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002482219
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521708
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003363459
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub [Games and Economic Behavior, 2019] conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306471
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284909
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318840
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful "codecision makers", understanding of the final stage of the procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319781