We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and …-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

existence of the core, which is a fundamental concept in cooperative game theory, affects coalition formation, and we examine … to a real bargaining situation. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the existence of a core strongly … induces the formation of the grand coalition. Second, resulting allocations are frequently in the core when it exists and are …