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Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human subjects in laboratory environments. Attempts to reconcile this discrepancy have taken one or more of three routes: (1) expanding the agent foresight and scope of decisions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131912
Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human subjects in laboratory environments. Attempts to reconcile this discrepancy have taken one or more of three routes: (1) expanding the agent foresight and scope of decisions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031265
trades due to information asymmetries.In order to create a potential for social learning, we provide subjects with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866640
We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866528
We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information … Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866971
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) haveshown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations.This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharingmonetary rewards. But even when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866809
Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008759474
Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248900
We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213777
experimentalgames and two different information treatments. Through this 2x2 factorialdesign, we obtain results in line with some recent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866566