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Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining : Evidence from a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game

Boarini, Romina - 2011

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. The bargaining took the form of standard ultimatum games, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects and, in another treatment, French subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134131

Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity : an experimental study

Mak, Vincent; Zwick, Rami - In: Games 15 (2024) 4, pp. 1-29

complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured … value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand …, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015073214

Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game

Georg, Sebastian; Güth, Werner; Walkowitz, Gari; … - 2008

Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263869

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules among heterogeneous parties : empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations

Kesternich, Martin; Löschel, Andreas; Ziegler, Andreas - 2014

Given the vital and controversial debate on fairness concerns in international climate negotiations, the acceptance of … international climate negotiations to address the question whether negotiating weights for different fairness concepts may enlarge … the bargaining space among heterogeneous agents and overcome the currently dominating self-interested use of fairness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010357594

Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity

Lange, Andreas; Vogt, Carla - 2001

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445929