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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003456379
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In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such 'rule bending' is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an intermediary to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221031
In this paper, we consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the seller to bargain at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221033
In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such 'rule bending' is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an intermediary to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057584
In this paper, we consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the seller to bargain at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057587