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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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Strategic ignorance in bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2011
In his classic article An Essay on Bargaining Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282588
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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712
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Strategic ignorance in bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517429
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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
Conrads, Julian - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529
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Contract Design with Limited Commitment
Wambach, Achim - 2019
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
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A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution
Kim, Jin Yeub - 2017
This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971425
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'Take it or Leave it' Offers : Obstinacy and Endogenous Deadlines in Negotiations
Ozyurt, Selcuk - 2015
A bargainer uses "take it or leave it" offers to signal that he is not willing to make further concessions (commitment threat) and that he will leave the bargaining table unless his demand is accepted (exit threat). This paper investigates the impact of these threats on rational negotiators'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014127
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The Efficiency of Negotiations with Uncertainty and Multi-Dimensional Deals
Jackson, Matthew O. - 2020
We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852563
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Optimal deadlines for agreements
Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720