We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow...

We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways, but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint...

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...

Do contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on...

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. The bargaining took the form of standard ultimatum games, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects and, in another treatment, French subjects...

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...