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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan (contributor); Widgrén, Mika (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002390841
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Bilateral bargaining : theory and applications
Napel, Stefan - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647320
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Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame
Napel, Stefan - In: Games and economic behavior 43 (2003) 1, pp. 86-106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001759608
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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284909
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Inequality aversion in a variety of games : an indirect evolutionary analysis
Güth, Werner; Napel, Stefan - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 116 (2006), pp. 1037-1056
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003387112
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Bargaining and distribution of power in the EU's Conciliation Committee
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2003
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful codecision makers , understanding of the final stage of the procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509443
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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094
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Modelling bilateral bargaining: from perfect to bounded rationality
Napel, Stefan - In: The political economy of institutional evolution, (pp. 183-206). 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001983764
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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan (contributor); Widgrén, Mika (contributor) - 2004
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521708
Cover Image
The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002482219