values. The SSPI can serve as a control for power imbedded in voting blocs, permitting fuller analysis of other factors that …

The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer …

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining … interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al …

We examine the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and … interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al …

This paper studies voting behavior in proportional representation systems. It proposes a model in which coalition … use different voting strategies precisely when expect different coalitions. The implications of this are discussed …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … natural bargaining protocol, both expected payoffs and actual payoff division are proportional to the voting weights provided …

rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the …

rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the …

equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … probabilities exhibits systematic deviations from theory. This suggests that subjects do not fully grasp the subtle effects …