In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a`la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy 1964, and more recently Funk 2002). The...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through (generalized) axiomatic bargaining a` la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maxi- mize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy, 1964, and more...

I study a model of growth and income distribution in which workers and firms bargain à la Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155–162, 1950) over wages and productivity gains, taking into account the trade-offs faced by firms in choosing factor- augmenting technologies. The aggregate environment...