Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. Risk classification can be used to mitigate adverse selection and improve insurance...

We re-examine the problem of budget-constrained demand for insurance indemnification when the insured and the insurer disagree about the likelihoods associated with the realizations of the insurable loss. For ease of comparison with the classical literature, we adopt the original setting of...

Guaranteed renewability is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. It is well established in the literature that, when there is (only) risk type uncertainty, the optimal GR contract with renewal price set at the actuarially fair price for low risk types provides full...

The standard economic analysis of the insured-insurer relationship under moral hazard postulates a simplistic setup that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the insured was facing at the time of the accident and the...

Traditionally insurance agents are incentivised by payment of a commission on the premium they generate. A bonus payment received by the agent from the insurer, when the insured does not make a claim, is referred to as ‘No claim bonus' (NCB). NCB rewards the agent for her / his effort in...

We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according to the Maxmin-Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), whereas the insurer is a (risk-averse or risk-neutral) Expected-Utility maximizer. We characterize...

Two by-now folkloric results in the theory of risk sharing are that (i) any feasible allocation is convex-order-dominated by a comonotonic allocation; and (ii) an allocation is Pareto optimal for the convex order if and only if it is comonotonic. Here, comonotonicity corresponds to the...

The standard economic analysis of the insured-insurer relationship under moral hazard postulates a simplistic setup that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the insured was facing at the time of the accident and the...

On-demand insurance is an innovative business model from the InsurTech space, which provides coverage for episodic risks. It makes use of a simple fact in a practical way: People differ in their frequency of exposure as well as the probability of loss. The extra dimension of heterogeneity can be...

Technological progress has improved insurers' ability to monitor policyholders and has led to usage-based insurance (UBI) contracts that incorporate behavioral risk factors in pricing. Economic theory predicts that any informative monitoring signal should be adopted in equilibrium (see Shavell,...