distributors in an auction setting. Utilizing data on 814,000 public procurement auctions in Russia, I identify the causal effect …

differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous … the market may have contradictory effects on the incentive of firms to collude: it can make collusion easier for bottom …

We characterize the features of collusion involving retailers and their supplier, who engage in secret vertical … contracts and all equally care about future profits (“vertical collusion”). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than … collusion among retailers. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme. In …

Numerous recently uncovered cartels operated along the supply chain, with firms at one end facilitating collusion at …-and-spoke collusion. We make three contributions: i) Using court documents and pricing data we provide evidence that collusion existed at … both ends of the supply chain, ii) we show that collusion was effective, increasing inflation by about 40% and iii) we …

used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find that one quarter of a sample of convicted contemporary international … otherwise have undermined collusion. In other cases, distributors themselves had market power and received a share of cartel …

attain supra-competitive profits when contracts with retailers are secret. The stability of manufacturer collusion depends on … the retailers' beliefs. We consider various dynamic beliefs and find that industry-profit-maximizing collusion is feasible … for some. Collusion is even renegotiation-proof under trigger beliefs if a novel condition of opportunism-proofness holds …