Showing 1 - 10 of 439
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674459
We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341920
stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors … cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care … the asymmetries in the non cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482885
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers)that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490565
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451580
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals costs when downstream competition is à la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410253
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an infinite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the effects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952833
differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous … the market may have contradictory effects on the incentive of firms to collude: it can make collusion easier for bottom …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954129
This paper studies the competitive effects of a variety of publicly observable nonlinear contracts and vertical restraints in bilateral duopoly. When suppliers offer menus of contracts and inputs are sufficiently differentiated, there exist equilibria in which both retailers purchase from both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905287
stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors … cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care … the asymmetries in the non cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987391