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We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world,...
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This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and we refer to this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242107
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032334
We consider differentiated duopolists facing symmetric linear demands and using Cobb-Douglas technologies with two inputs: a monopolized input and a competitively supplied input. Unlike with fixed-proportions technologies, a merger between the input monopolist and either firm can reduce welfare....
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One key concern in vertical merger cases is input foreclosure. Input foreclosure involves raising the costs of competitors in the downstream market, which could in turn increase the sales and profits of the downstream merger partner. In this article, we explain how the upward pricing pressure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036804
We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand — unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship — for either Cournot or Bertrand competition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976946
A vertical merger between a firm and an input supplier to that firm can generate efficiencies by eliminating double marginalization or alleviating other contracting inefficiencies. However, when the supplier also sells to that firm's rivals, a key antitrust concern is input foreclosure: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012830804
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