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We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009159200
We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125361
We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101966
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I investigate the effect of exclusive territories, which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms. Using shipping spatial models, I consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets. An upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074903
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We provide a simple model to investigate decisions on vertical integration/separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final products of the local downstream monopolists. Depending on their cost structure, downstream firms' decisions on vertical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929957
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921809