We consider infinitely repeated vertical relations when a retailer can sell an established product and a new product that is initially inferior but can improve over time. We find that the retailer has an incentive to sell the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. The...

We characterize the features of collusion involving retailers and their supplier, who engage in secret vertical contracts and all equally care about future profits (“vertical collusion”). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. The supplier pays retailers...

This paper asks whether a privately informed retailer may have an incentive to share its marketing data with the manufacturer, in a way that would enable the manufacturer to gain ex-post, but non-contractible information. I consider an infinitely repeated dynamic vertical relations with adverse...

We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier – who are all equally patient ("vertical collusion"). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier's...

We consider vertical restraints in the context of an intrabrand competition model in which a single manufacturer deals with two vertically differentiated retailers. We establish two main results. First, if the market cannot be vertically segmented and the cost difference between the two...

The paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between vertical manufacturer-retailer hierarchies. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand, consequently manufacturers pay retailers “information rents”. I compare between several collusive equilibria that differ in the...