Existing studies, largely based in the transaction cost economics tradition, approach the issue of vertical scope from the point of view of the decision faced by the individual firm about whether to make or buy, given a set of existing markets and well-defined vertical segments. However, recent...

We show how an upstream firm by using a price-dependent profit-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic. As a...

If an upstream manufacturer can use coupons to price discriminate, the downstream retailer can also use coupons to price discriminate. In doing so, the retailer takes a share of the price discrimination profit from the manufacturer. To gain a larger profit share, the retailer has an incentive to...

We consider the issue of first- and second-mover advantages in a vertically related market. First, we show that the standard conclusions about sequential-move games under Bertrand and Cournot competitions can change in the context of a vertically related market. This is because an upstream...

We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers, assuming that the manufacturer sets the input price after observing the terms of the incentive contracts offered to management in the downstream market. Thus, we compare the two...

We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers. Thus, we compare the two models: (1) decentralized bargaining between manufacturers and retailers including two-part tariff contract (2) linear input pricing without bargaining....

Oil and gas exploration companies (E&Ps) exhibit large variations in earnings due to volatile oil and gas prices. Furthermore, their primary asset, oil and gas reserves, is accumulated through highly risky exploration activities. In contrast, integrated oil and gas companies display lower...

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firmsshare the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress thedifferences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resultingfrom the traditional example...

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence inputand output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under adecreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant....

This paper investigates the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple model with nancial imperfections andincomplete contracts. Then, we investigate these...