It is well-known that a seller imposed non-discrimination clause can soften downstream price competition by constraining opportunistic pricing behavior on the part of an upstream monopolist seller. But what about about market settings in which there exists a pivotal buyer? We show that in the...

We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it has sufficient market power anyways. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power and uses observable two-part tariffs. We...

We examine vertical backward integration in a reducedform model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate...

I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique data set collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With weekly movie theater information on prices, revenues and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters...

We investigate a vertically integrated theater's contract and screen allocation decisions in a movie industry characterized by demand uncertainty, price uniformity, and revenue-sharing contracts. Based on a simple theoretical model that describes the decisions of theaters and movie distributors,...

We study how vertical integration in a two-sided media market affects investments in premium content. We show that a content provider provides the premium content exclusively to a platform, regardless of what the vertical structure of the industry is. However, a vertically integrated content...

We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to...

I examine the release date scheduling of all motion pictures that went into wide release in the US in 1995 and 1996 to investigate the effects of vertical market structure on competition. The evidence suggests that complex vertical structures involving multiple upstream or downstream firms...

We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration in China's movie industry. We leverage data covering all theaters and 423 popular movies in China during 2014-2018. Integrated theaters show their movies for longer, allocate more screenings, and charge lower prices. There is no evidence...