In the absence of constraints on the state based on rule of law, there is a dilemma facing the state: when the state has the incentives to enforce contracts, it also has the incentives for predation. We demonstrate that information available to the state can determine the outcome in such a...

Courts are willing, in commercial contests, to enforce promises even without consideration when enforcement supports a norm of reciprocity -- a norm which recognizes that such promises are seldom totally gratuitous, but are often made in furtherance of reciprocal, long-term, trust-based...

We model the interaction of a single buyer with a single supplier within a market in a developing country with homogeneous local suppliers and homogeneous buyers from developed nations. The buyer sources a product from a supplier and then inspects and sells it on the market, subject to quality...

Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...

In this article we study the relation between the quality of contract enforcement and R&D investment across countries and industries. If companies invest successfully in R&D they are open for exploitation by their supplier if supply contracts are not enforceable. This hold-up problem can reduce...

We relate the design of contract law to the process of development. In this paper, contract law defines which private agreements are enforceable (i.e. are binding and enforced by courts) and which are not. Specically, we consider an economy where agents face a hold-up problem (moral hazard in...