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The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives

Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We … study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given … unobservable effort. The organization has two types of valuable projects, high and low impact, only the former of which requires …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048

Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities

Packham, Natalie - 2015

In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and - under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020053

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Gershkov, Alex; Perry, Motty - 2010

This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069

Staged-Financing Contracts with Private Information

Wang, Hefei - 2008

This paper studies the use of incentive contracts in the Bolton-Scharfstein (1990) model when some agents in the population are technically constrained from falsifying reports and stealing cash. The original Bolton-Scharfstein contract may not be optimal for a large range of parametric values....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057550

Optimal Contract Under Moral Hazard with Soft Information

Roger, Guillaume - 2012

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111160

The sources of financing constraints

Nikolov, Boris; Schmid, Lukas; Steri, Roberto - 2018

In order to identify the relevant sources of firms' financing constraints, we ask what financial frictions matter for corporate policies. To that end, we build, solve, and estimate a range of dynamic models of corporate investment and financing, embedding a host of financial frictions. We focus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976900

Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures' managers

Bellavitis, Cristiano; Kamuriwo, Dzidziso Samuel; … - In: Journal of general management 43 (2017/2018) 1, pp. 33-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011912152

How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance

Wynant, Luc; Manigart, Sophie; Collewaert, Veroniek - In: Venture capital : an international journal of … 25 (2023) 2, pp. 135-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299460

Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device

Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894

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