We study the optimal duration of contracts in a principal-agent framework with both moral hazard and adverse selection …. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts …, which serve to screen the ability of newly hired agents, cannot be longer than continuation contracts, offered to successful …

investment by a buyer and a seller. Contracts may specify a required quality level and an upper bound to the cost of production … damages ; Cadillac contracts ; incomplete contracts ; cooperative investments …

This paper examines the ex post flexibility of U.S. labor contracts during the 1970-95 period by investigating whether … episodes of increased inflation uncertainty, our results suggest that these contracts are flexible both ex ante and ex post to …

this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments. …

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous … literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic … contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like …

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings …. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that … the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies …