We consider the problem of finding equilibrium asset prices in a financial market in which a portfolio manager (Agent) invests on behalf of an investor (Principal), who compensates the manager with an optimal contract. We extend a model from Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley (2014) by allowing general...

Previous literature documents that mutual funds' flows increase more than linearly with realized performance. I show this convex flow-performance relationship is consistent with a dynamic contracting model in which investors learn about the fund manager's skill. My model predicts that flows...

We examine optimal dynamic contracts when the firm's production generates harmful pollution undermining its productivity. The optimal contract rewards for financial performance and penalizes pollution. The combination of both contract sensitivities incentivizes the agent's effort and...

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or investments which produce a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division...

We explore buyback contracts in a supplier-retailer supply chain where the retailer faces a price-dependent downward-sloping demand curve subject to uncertainty. We formulate the problem as a supplier-led Stackelberg game and derive explicitly the equilibrium contract parameters along with the...

We present a continuous-time agency model under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties, where both the principal and agent exhibit Gilboa-Schmeidler's extreme ambiguity aversion. For this, we extend the martingale method well known in the agency literature, by allowing not only the mean...

Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream...