Showing 1 - 10 of 226
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266677
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281267
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003785043
Judges become ambitious decision makers when they face appellate review. This paper applies a contract theoretic perspective to the behavior of self-interested trial judges in a twolevel court system and analyzes the consequences for contracting in “the shadow of” the court. Confronted with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010232650
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798345
This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier's (2009) work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120699
Nach dem Grundsatz 'pacta sunt servanda' ermöglichen Verträge den Beteiligten das Vertrauen in den Bestand eines Leistungsversprechens. Die Zivilgerichte können jedoch in der Praxis pflichtgemäßes und vertragswidriges Verhalten nicht fehlerfrei unterscheiden. Unter Zuhilfenahme des...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292652
International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement, which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The paper analyses this problem from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608478
We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (?Pre-Bosman? or P), currently in use (?Bosman? or B), and recently approved (?Monti? or M) differ with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262824
Recent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263148