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-enforceable private contracts (regulation). However, because this mechanism is costly, its effectiveness depends on the aggregate … institutions and regulation is delayed for the later stages. At this point of time, the hold-up problem is solved and this spurs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343845
provide higher quality services to all consumers. The externality renders the market outcome inefficient. Price regulation …, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory … provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024566
all, in a sense to be made precise. -- Asymmetric Information ; Learning by Doing ; Regulation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
that the person on whom the regulation is directly incident — the principal — is not intrinsically biased. I also show that … the regulation can be counter-productive if it attempts to enforce perfect fairness (the first-best allocation) when that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035633
Abstract We develop a tractable model of competitive insurance markets with a continuum of types and exogenous restrictions on the set of allowed contracts. Our model nests, as special cases, the market for lemons of Akerlof (1970) and the unrestricted contracts setting of Rothschild and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306176
We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy with soft information. The supervisor may be inefficient such that a noisy signal on the agents’ effort levels is observed. On one hand, the agents require risk premiums to work due to the noisy signal. On the other hand, the supervisor and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033781
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström were awarded the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their path breaking work.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a relevation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator whi assigns contracts and recommends the principla whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator randomizes over a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322
unobservable to the regulator. The regulator can avoid this problem by a tighter regulation in the first period. This induces the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482509