We consider a decentralized supply chain in which a downstream manufacturer purchases components from an upstream supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to the manufacturer, is either low or high. We examine two...

We explore buyback contracts in a supplier-retailer supply chain where the retailer faces a price-dependent downward-sloping demand curve subject to uncertainty. We formulate the problem as a supplier-led Stackelberg game and derive explicitly the equilibrium contract parameters along with the...

We study the impact of limited inventory on optimal salesforce compensation contracts. We use the framework of Oyer (2000), characterized by limited liability and rent sharing with the agent. A commonly invoked assumption in the inventory management literature is that the demand distribution...

This paper investigates the optimal management of supply disruptions by a manufacturer who uses order inflation and/or investments in process reliability when contracting two risk-averse suppliers. We consider that these investments can be subject to moral hazard. Technically we solve a...

We model the interaction of a single buyer with a single supplier within a market in a developing country with homogeneous local suppliers and homogeneous buyers from developed nations. The buyer sources a product from a supplier and then inspects and sells it on the market, subject to quality...

We study a retailer's sourcing contract when the supplier's reservation profit (offered by his outside options) depends on his cost, which is privately known to only the supplier. An interesting discovery from our analysis is that supply chain coordination may be achieved despite the...