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We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels whose legal … implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find that cartels economize on contract clauses, cartels in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060465
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161631
Contracts between entities within the public sector are exempt from public procurement rules if they meet the requirements set out in Article 12 of Directive 2014/24.The ECJ’s judgement in case C-295/05 (Asemfo) left unanswered the issue of how deeply Competition law applies to in-house...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255517
In this article we study the relation between the quality of contract enforcement and R&D investment across countries …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342222
Contracts involving promises to commit criminal acts are ordinarily unenforceable. Yet nonenforcement does not fully deter incentives to form criminal agreements. This Article demonstrates that partial enforcement can generate greater deterrence incentives by disrupting the trust relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242666
No–poaching clauses (NPCs) have recently come under scrutiny due to their potentially anti–competitive impact on wages. However they can also enhance efficiency. We use data from the US chain restaurant industry to assess the effect of such clauses on wages and we find robust evidence of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345114
intervention. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010258770
The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012414922
I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000888987