This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-hazard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting the principal choose the amount of monitoring allocated across...

This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-hazard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting the principal choose the amount of monitoring allocated across...

This paper empirically examines the interplay of formal and relational contracting in the Spanish movie industry. To do so, I test implications from well-established theories on relational contracting using a unique data set from a Spanish movie exhibitor that contains detailed information on...

As documented by Macauley (1963) and others, informal contracts are pervasive in modern economies. Yet, systematic empirical evidence on them is still limited. In this paper, we provide a framework to investigate the determinants and consequences of informal contracts. First, we present a model...