We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and … find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy …

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre … trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusions of verbal communication generates … trustworthiness in the sense of adhering to agreements, and we find that both are enhanced when the parties can use words, and …

definitions of trust and trustworthiness based on revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and the response to it. … motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences - like altruism, inequality aversion, quasi …-regarding preferences - vulnerability-responsiveness is an important determinant of trustworthiness even in cases where the vulnerability of …

? Experiments of the Trust Game and Dictator Game are employed to measure an individual's behavior. Additionally, a quiz assessing …

important primitives of social capital - trust and reciprocity - which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … behavioural trust or trustworthiness and attitudinal trust or disposition to reciprocate. However, dividing subjects according to … attitudinal trust and trustworthiness, we observe that the link between the questionnaire and experimental sessions is more subtle …

provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their design. Only a preceding stage (safe outside option vs. enter the game …) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly higher rates of selfish choices in our treatments that …

other hand, efficiency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivations. We also …

important primitives of social capital trust and reciprocity - which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash equilibrium …

designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor’s action space in two versions of the “trust game … investment but limit investors’ demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all-in” investors are less generously … reciprocated than when they can invest any amount, where full investments area clearer signal of trustworthiness …

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre … trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusion of verbal communication generates both … and trustworthiness in the sense of adhering to agreements, and we find that both are enhanced when the parties can use …