We develop a theory of equilibrium market volatility in a general equilibrium duopoly with complete information. The resulting economic system possesses a property, which can be described as ‘natural volatility' of markets, even if players have complete information.Economy is described as a...

In this paper, we investigate the volatility and risk-relevance of the standard deviation of two reported income measures; net income and comprehensive income for a sample of U.S non-financial firms over the period 2005-2010. We find that comprehensive income is more volatile than net income. We...

This paper investigates alternative models of learning to explain changes in uncertainty surrounding earnings innovations. As a proxy for investor uncertainty, we use model-free implied volatilities; as a proxy for earnings innovations, representing signals of firm performance likely to drive...

We investigate the impact of the French 2012 financial transaction tax on trading activity, volatility, and price efficiency measured by first-order autocorrelation. We extend empirical research by analysing anticipation and reallocation effects. In addition, we consider measures for long-run...

This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its "social capital" by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas...

We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real time gross settlement setting. We find that the game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and that it encompasses two...

We analyze a class of games with interdependent values and linear best responses. The payoff uncertainty is described by a multivariate normal distribution that includes the pure common and pure private value environment as special cases. We characterize the set of joint distributions over...

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic...

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

In multi-party systems, parties often form alliances before elections. What brings competing parties to coalesce into new entities? I present a model of electoral competition in which parties can form pre-electoral alliances and decide how binding these should be. Parties face a dynamic...