Basierend auf einem neuen, die deutschen Prime-Standard-Unternehmen für die Jahre 2005 bis 2007 umfassenden Datensatz untersuchen wir die Determinanten der Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung. Dabei unterscheiden wir drei Kategorien möglicher Einflussfaktoren: Unternehmens-, Performance- und...

We study changes in the design of CEO contracts when firms transition from being public with dispersedshareholders to having strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. These principals redesignsome, but far from all, contract characteristics. There is no evidence that they reduce...

Basierend auf einem neuen, die deutschen Prime-Standard-Unternehmen für die Jahre 2005 bis 2007 umfassenden Datensatz untersuchen wir die Determinanten der Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung. Dabei unterscheiden wir drei Kategorien möglicher Einflussfaktoren: Unternehmens-, Performance- und...

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their re-election to express displeasure over the directors'...

We document three current trends in the compensation of non-executive directors in Germany. First, firms increasingly use performance-insensitive variable pay components, like committee and attendance fees. Second, this comes at the expense of performance-oriented variable pay components, which...

This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price of the stock options they are granted at the time of their firm's IPO. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between IPO grants and IPO underpricing, this paper finds such...

This paper investigates whether and how three social-psychological factors − reciprocity, similarity and role experience − affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total and fixed compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from...

Executive compensation serves as a metric by which investors measure the quality of a firm's governance. In this paper, I explore how the signaling role of executive compensation impacts the compensation decisions of boards. I show that reputational concerns often cause boards to adopt pay...

The study examines the Russian and Belarusian Board of Directors. The study benchmarks remuneration systems of international best practices, international industry recommendations, and internal Corporate governance code's provisions. The Russian Boards of Directors have limited control over the...

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the...