This study bridges the gap between theory and practice of risk management in banks incorporated in Saudi Arabia. The main objective of this study is to investigate the risk management process to assess the level of involvement of boards in risk management practices (RMPs). This study surveys...

In this paper, I develop a search-matching model which predicts that new CEOs who are better matches to the firms will stay longer, perform better, and require less initial compensation. Using comprehensive EXECUCOMP dataset merged with unique data on CEO succession plans, I find significant...

This paper studies the optimal structure of the board with an emphasis on the expertise of directors. The analysis provides three main results. First, the expertise of a value-maximizing board can harm shareholder value. Second, it is optimal to design a board whose members are biased against...

This paper tests the effects of the independence and financial knowledge of directors on risk management and firm value in the gold mining industry. Our original hand-collected database on directors' financial education, accounting background, and financial experience allows us to test the...

This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication...

Using a parsimonious setup, we shed light on two channels through which a small amount of social pressure exerted by a CEO on board directors may increase the company value even in the absence of the classic tradeoff between the board's monitoring and advising tasks. First, the pressure reduces...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards affects investment efficiency. The model entails a CEO who encounters an investment project and decides either or not to present it for approval to a board of directors. The CEO may need to collect and report investment-relevant...

A revised version of this paper, titled "Board bias, information, and investment efficiency," is available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3965147A CEO who is an empire-builder reports information about an investment opportunity ("project"). Before approving or...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards influences investment efficiency and identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project, gathers investment-relevant information, and decides whether or not to...

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions and may lead to investment inefficiencies. To counteract this challenge, incentive compensation for corporate...