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Chapter 1. Corporate Governance and Control

Becht, Marco; Bolton, Patrick; Röell, Ailsa - 2003

Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023875

Board Composition After Mergers : Does It Matter to Target Shareholders?

Wang, Hongxia - 2018

This paper examines whether post-merger board composition affects the premiums paid to target shareholders. Using a … sample of 207 stock-for-stock mergers from 1996 to 2004, we show that target merger premiums vary inversely with target … director representation on the post-merger board. We also provide some evidence that both inside and outside target directors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911226

Power and Information : The Effect of Board Networks on Mergers and Acquisitions

Etheridge, Dane Rees - 2010

Director interlocking is a controversial phenomenon, and many countries have implemented regulation limiting multiple directorships. In contrast, Australian companies and directors are relatively free to develop board networks. This paper extends the research on the effects of interlocking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149017

Governance mandates, outside directors, and acquirer performance

Dahya, Jay; Golubov, Andrey; Petmezas, Dimitris; … - 2016

We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646285

A contingency model of board characteristics and foreign institutional investor ownership : the moderating role of firm size and market valuation

Nair, Smitha; Gopikumar, V.; Viswanathan, P. K.; … - In: Cogent economics & finance 8 (2020) 1, pp. 1-17

We investigate the governance sensitivity of foreign institutional investors' (FII) ownership in a large emerging market setting of India, characterized by highly concentrated insider ownership. More specifically, we focus on the moderating role of firm size and price to book value (PB) in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012219254

Corporate governance and takeover outcomes

Aktas, Nihat; Croci, Ettore; Simsir, Serif Aziz - In: Corporate governance : an international review 24 (2016) 3, pp. 242-252

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011528971

The impact of firm ownership, board monitoring on operating performance of Chinese mergers and acquisitions

Boateng, Agyenim; Bi, Xiao Gang; Brahma, Sanjukta - In: Review of quantitative finance and accounting 49 (2017) 4, pp. 925-948

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011797575

CEO Compensation and Stock Mispricing : How Do Boards React to Mutual Fund Flow-Driven Price Pressure?

Cai, Jie - 2019

We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905487

Board Monitoring, CEO Incentives, and Shareholder Activism

Keusch, Thomas - 2018

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936387

CEO Compensation and Stock Mispricing : How Do Boards React to Mutual Fund Flow-Driven Price Pressure?

Cai, Jie - 2017

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970983

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