In this study, we examine whether the levels and structures of top executive compensation vary discernibly with different levels of board independence. We also examine how the newly mandated adoption of the remuneration committee (RC) in Taiwan affects the board independence-executive pay...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms whose boards were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ independence requirements than in firms that were compliant. We document that 65% of the magnitude is driven by a single outlier. All our attempts to...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865...

We document three current trends in the compensation of non-executive directors in Germany. First, firms increasingly use performance-insensitive variable pay components, like committee and attendance fees. Second, this comes at the expense of performance-oriented variable pay components, which...

In their reply to our critique, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2012) suggest that (i) Apple is a prime example of how board regulations affect CEO pay and should therefore not be excluded from the study, and (ii) their original results are robust to excluding the outliers when extending the...

Using Chhaochharia's and Grinstein's (JF, 2009) data and methodology, Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (JF, 2010) document that compensation committee independence leads to an increase in executive pay, and that the increase is concentrated in firms with powerful monitors. These findings stand in...

This paper investigates whether and how three social-psychological factors − reciprocity, similarity and role experience − affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total and fixed compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from...

This study examines the remuneration of non-executive directors, examining individual monitoring characteristics and director capital in addition to firm characteristics. Using a large sample of FTSE All-Share non-executive directors from 2001-2012, we find that remuneration is positively linked...

Greater gender diversity on bank board of directors is associated with higher compensation inequality because CEOs at these banks have higher base salary. This effect disappears during the financial crisis, largely due to adjustment of non-salary compensation