This study examines the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In particular, it addresses the incentives within the agency theory framework for both inside and independent directors to disclosure additional information voluntarily. Further, it provides...

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue...

Board of directors is one of the internal governance mechanisms that are intended to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned. Among the most significant governance issues currently faced by the modern corporation are those relating to diversity. In this paper,...

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue...

I use a sample of 409 companies that restate their earnings in 1997-2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are...

This paper analyzes the information asymmetry between owners/managers and creditors. More specifically, the research investigates the role of both disclosure on financial key performance indicators (FKPIs) and different corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency costs of debt. The...

This paper studies the effects of interlocked boards of directors on voluntary disclosures, governance practices and earnings quality. The Canadian environment, where director interlocks are prevalent, is examined. A checklist of twenty voluntary disclosure measures from proxy statements is...

Family control is a common phenomenon among listed corporations in the Indonesian capital market. In family-controlled firms, the so-called “Agency Problem II” may arise due to differences of interests between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Firms may choose certain...

We find that firms are less likely to report an internal control material weakness (as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) in a given year if one of their audit committee members is concurrently on the board of a firm that disclosed a material weakness within the prior three years. We find a...