A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values … of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting … vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information …

We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage …, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage …, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

. In this paper policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game. The implications of this change …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …