We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

This study presents a two-period overlapping-generations model featuring en- dogenous growth and intergenerational conflict over fiscal policy. In particular, we characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game between gen- erations, and show the following results. First,...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an...

This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring endogenous growth, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over fiscal policy. We charac- terize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and across generations and show the following results....